FONSECA-ROBBINS, JOHN

Environmental Issues

O FUNDAMENTALISMO

Posted by mar19433 on June 21, 2007

COMUNICAÇÃO POLÍTICA – O FUNDAMENTALISMO

Face à corrente constatação focada nos extremistas Islâmicos, este artigo pretende desmistificar algumas asserções associadas ao fundamentalismo. Os fundamentalistas religiosos nem são restritos a qualquer crença ou país, nem apenas aos pobres ou iletrados. Mas, são aqueles que emergem a qualquer momento e local, que sentem a necessidade da luta por uma cultura secular, ateia – mesmo que para tal fim, tenham que deixar para trás a ortodoxia de todas a suas tradições. Na realidade, fundamentalistas por todo o lado partilham uma habilidade em comum, ou seja, a criação de mensagens apropriadas ao seu tempo.

Todo o fundamentalismo é religioso. Podemos dizer que variadas organizações partilham características básicas dos fundamentalistas religiosos, inter alia: instituem limites, exigem obediência incondicional de todos, consomem avultadas energias na administração e manutenção de barreiras entre o devoto e o ímpio, e constroem fortalezas secretas e dogmáticas envolvendo “a verdade”; afirmando a sua versão como absoluta, infalível, ou inerrante. Por vezes, procuram manifestações do “fundamentalismo secular” nas diversas tendências envenenadas em nacionalismo; ou no extremismo ideológico dos movimentos revolucionários ou terroristas, desde o Baader-Meinhof Gang até ao Shining Path de Peru. Num estilo similar, podíamos até falar de “fundamentalismo científico” para sugerir a suposição, abordada pelos cientistas modernos, e filósofos, que o conhecimento empiricamente baseado é o único e seguro caminho para “a verdade”.

O fundamentalismo não é restrito ao monoteísmo. Tal como outra importante religião da Ásia meridional, o siquismo, que produziu a sua equidade de candidatos à família dos fundamentalistas, estas grandes tradições de crença e prática orientam discípulos para uma realidade (ou irrealidade) que transcende ou interpreta ilusório o mundo mundano. Variadas religiões produziram poderosos, contra-secular, contra-modernismo, absolutistas, exclusivistas, e geralmente movimentos violentos, cuja semelhança se aproxima ao fundamentalismo do mundo Judaico, Cristão, e Islâmico.

O fundamentalismo atrai ricos e pobres. Os quadros islâmicos estão repletos de pessoas das mais variadas origens e educação, incluindo descendentes de famílias abastadas, muitos deles doutorados pelas universidades Ocidentais. Mohammed Atta, o estudante baseado em Hamburgo, que aprendeu a pilotagem de aeronaves, em preparação para o voo fatídico n.º 11 da American Airlines (que colidiu contra a torre Norte do World Trade Centre, “Sept 11, 2001”) é típico do fundamentalista dos nossos dias – o iletrado, homem do campo, não é, certamente.

O fundamentalismo conduz à violência? Não, necessariamente. O contexto social, a cultura política regional ou local condicionam a direcção e objectivos do fundamentalismo. Entre os estados Islâmicos, ou temos lideranças fracas, ineptas, e decadentes ou então, repressivas, prepotentes, e ditatoriais. Em ambos casos, estamos em presença de variantes que fomentam, e encorajem o fundamentalismo violento, dedicado, e focado na destruição, substituição e mudança radical do estado (como os “taliban” fizeram no Afeganistão) ou na remoção total do poder (como os xiitas o perpetraram no Irão, e os grupos islâmicos radicais o esperaram praticar no Egipto, Arábia Saudita, e Argélia).

Os fundamentalistas fomentam a mudança. Eles querem mudar o mundo que eles vêem como um mundo ateu, mas a sua terapia não é preservar ou recriar o passado. Eles vivem num mundo, materialista, moderno, e técnico, porém, ao mesmo tempo, actuam na desvalorização dos conceitos que promovem a desumanização, e a filosofia materialista e hipocrisia ocidental, aliás, temas ardentemente defendidos desde sempre, pelos membros da organização “al Qaeda”. Da mesma forma, Sayyid Qutb, o eminente ideólogo da Irmandade Muçulmana antes da sua execução pelo Presidente Abdel Nasser em 1966, no Egipto, asseverava que as sociedades Muçulmanas tinham descendido ao estado de “jahiliyya” (pré-Islâmico barbarismo e ignorância). Uma das suas asserções visava testar, e separar individualmente o verdadeiro devoto do ímpio, do infiel, e assim justificar uma derradeira “jihad” contra o último: o conceito “jihad”, a luta do devoto contra as suas paixões profanas, transformou-se numa guerra externa a todos os infiéis. Os fundamentalistas não se opõem à mudança; eles especializam-se nela.

By John Fonseca-Robbins
Sept 2002

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FORFAITING COUNTRY LIST UPDATE

Posted by mar19433 on May 12, 2007

UPDATING FORFAITING – FONSECA-ROBBINS
Countries and Maximum Maturities

Last Updated – Saturday, 12 May 2007

Americas
MaxYears
ARGENTINA
5
BOLIVIA
*
BRAZIL
5
CANADA
7
CHILE
5
COLOMBIA
5
COSTA RICA
3
DOMINICAN REP.
3
ECUADOR
*
EL SALVADOR
3
GUATEMALA
3
HONDURAS
1
JAMAICA
1
MEXICO
5
NICARAGUA
*
PANAMA
5
PERU
5
PUERTO RICO
5
T & TOBAGO
5
URUGUAY
3
U.S.A.
7
VENEZUELA
3
Africa
MaxYears
ANGOLA
1
BOTSWANA
5
BURKINA FASO
*
CAMEROON
*
ETHIOPIA
*
GABON
*
GAMBIA
*
GHANA
2
KENYA
3
LESOTHO
1
MADAGASCAR
1
MALAWI
*
MALI
*
MAURITANIA
*
MAURITIUS
5
MOZAMBIQUE
3
NAMIBIA
5
NIGERIA
3
SENEGAL
1
SOUTH AFRICA
7
SWAZILAND
2
TANZANIA
1
UGANDA
1
ZAMBIA
*

Europe
MaxYears
AUSTRIA
7
AZERBAIJAN
3
BELGIUM
7
BOSNIA
5
BULGARIA
5
CROATIA
5
CYPRUS
5
CZECH
5
DENMARK
7
EIRE
7
ESTONIA
5
FINLAND
7
FRANCE
7
GERMANY
7
GREECE
5
HUNGARY
5
ICELAND
5
ITALY
7
KAZAKHSTAN
5
LATVIA
5
LITHUANIA
5
LUXEMBOURG
7
MACEDONIA
3
MALTA
5
NETHERLANDS
7
NORWAY
7
POLAND
5
PORTUGAL
7
ROMANIA
5
RUSSIA
7
SERBIA
5
SLOVAKIA
5
SLOVENIA
5
SPAIN
7
SWEDEN
7
SWITZERLAND
7
TURKEY
5
U.K.
7
UKRAINE
3
UZBEKISTAN
2

Middle East
MaxYears
ALGERIA
5
BAHRAIN
5
EGYPT
5
ISRAEL
5
JORDAN
5
KUWAIT
5
LEBANON
1
LIBYA
5
MOROCCO
5
OMAN
5
QATAR
5
SAUDI ARABIA
5
TUNISIA
5
U.A.E.
5
Far East
MaxYears
AUSTRALIA
7
BANGLADESH
1
CHINA
5
HONG KONG
5
INDIA
5
INDONESIA
5
JAPAN
7
MALAYSIA
5
NEW ZEALAND
7
PAKISTAN
5
PHILIPPINES
5
SINGAPORE
7
SOUTH KOREA
5
SRI LANKA
2
TAIWAN
5
THAILAND
5
VIETNAM
5

* Transactions on these countries considered on a case by case basis
The countries listed above are those for which we are prepared to consider the discount on a “without recourse” basis and/or silent confirmation up to the period shown for bills of exchange, promissory notes, irrevocable letters of credit or receivables, normally guaranteed by a first class bank.

JFR

Posted in BANKING | Leave a Comment »

CAPTIVATE SUBSCRIBERS

Posted by mar19433 on May 11, 2007

How To Build A Massive, Hyper Responsive List Of Eager Subscribers

Every online business provides great service to generate satisfaction among their customers. As each and every customer receives satisfaction over their products or the services they get, there is a great chance that they will become a return customer and buy again. Better yet, they will recommend you to other people that could generate more business for you and your site. As more traffic is driven to your site, you can entice many of them to subscribe to your mailing list or opt-in list. This is a list where in website visitors agree to be sent promotional materials such as newsletters, catalogues and such that could keep them updated about your site or the niche of your site.

These promotional materials are sent via e-mail to the members of the list in different time intervals. When using e-mail as the media of your marketing and advertisements, you eliminate the need for high costs. Email is free and if you can manage to make your own promotional advertisements you can also save a bundle there. With an opt-in subscribers list, you are sure that what you are sending out is received, viewed and read by the subscribers and not simply being deleted. They have signed up for service and have consented in receiving it.This means that there are constant reminders to your subscribers about all your products, new products and services as well as any promotions and special deals you are having. There is also the chance that they can be forwarded to other potential customers as they tell their friends and families about you and your site. Of course, you should be also aware that a subscriber may unsubscribe when they feel that they are not getting what they want or expected.

Make sure that they are satisfied with your opt-in marketing strategies and keep them excited in receiving your newsletters and catalogues. Here are some tips that can help you build a list of eager subscribers:

Make your promotional materials interesting and fun.

Try to use a little creativity but not too over artsy.

Build around what your product or service is about. For example; if you are selling car parts, put some pictures of what is new in the auto parts world, a new wing door possibly that can fit any car and make it look like a Lamborghini.

Try to research what people are looking for, these way, you stay one step ahead of them all the time and you will be their bearer of new tidings. They will be eager to receive what you are sending them because they new you always have fresh and new things to share with them. Write good articles that can be very informational but light at the same time. If your subscribers enjoy your articles, they will go to your site by clicking the links that you will be putting on your newsletter to read some more.

You can provide articles that can connect to many people. Be diverse in your articles. Put something humorous, then put something informational, then put something that has both. Are you wary about this because you don’t like writing? No problem, there are many professional and experienced article writers that can do the job for you for minimal fees. They know what they are doing and can provide the need that you have for your newsletters, the money that you pay for your articles are going to be met by the many sign-ups and the potential profit from the sales that you will get.

Create and send an E-book to your customers about anything that is related to your business or site. Use your knowledge and expertise in the field you have chosen to help other people who are similarly interested.

Offer this e-book for free. You can write about anything informational and helpful to your subscribers. For example, you can do manuals and guides in so many things. This e-book could be used as a reference for many people. Share this e-book with everyone, even other sites; just make sure that they don’t change the links in the e-book that will lead people to your site. If you want, you can always get some people to write it for you just like your articles. Your investment once again will be covered by the great marketing this will generate.

Add e-coupons in your newsletters that will help them avail to special discounts. Put a control number in your e-coupon so that they can only be used once. When people get discounts that can be found in your newsletters, they will be eager to receive your newsletter in anticipation of what you are promoting next.If your subscribers can get benefits from your newsletters, they will be very eager to receive them. Just don’t flood your mailing list with mails so that you don’t annoy your subscribers.
Check it out:

Other marketing ideas:
http://www.yaswebsites.com/237558

John Fonseca-Robbins

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O EXTREMISMO NO MÉDIO ORIENTE

Posted by mar19433 on February 22, 2007

COMUNICAÇÃO POLÍTICA O EXTREMISMO NO MÉDIO ORIENTE

Para os líderes da organização “al Qaeda”, o conflito do após 11 de Setembro de 2001, com os EUA é uma variação num longo processo histórico. Na procura de metáforas, arrisco-me a dizer que bin Laden considera a luta no Afeganistão como apenas uma batalha numa longa guerra inacabada. Esta imagem, contudo, é confusa, porque enfatiza a noção dum conflito bilateral. Para “al Qaeda”, a luta primária é entre os líderes apóstatas do Médio Oriente e as forças do “verdadeiro” Islão, das quais “al Qaeda” faz parte. A superioridade relativa de cada um dos adversários no campo de batalha no Afeganistão, embora não incoerente ou inconsistente do ponto de vista defendido e definido pela “al Qaeda”, não é de forma nenhuma uma medida precisa, e descritiva de sucesso ou prostração. Tendo em conta a facilidade de reorganização da “al Qaeda”, o mero reposicionamento das suas actividades para outras regiões, constitui só por si uma grande vitória, e, mesmo a destruição total da organização não é considerada como um insucesso. Se, por exemplo, a erradicação dos membros da “al Qaeda” resultasse no enfraquecimento progressivo dos regimes apóstatas, e ao mesmo tempo o seu martírio inspirasse outros tantos devotos, então, a sua destruição seria considerada como um grande êxito político.
Esta atitude reflecte uma proposta coerente face aos difíceis factos da vida e actual situação no Médio Oriente, onde a influência Ocidental embora permanentemente presente é ao mesmo tempo, ilícita. O domínio Ocidental – político, económico, e militar – connosco há mais de duzentos anos, é para continuar. Contudo, os termos específicos das inter-relações do Ocidente vis-à-vis o Médio Oriente transbordam em flexibilidades, e transição, e, por tal, sempre sujeitos à negociação. Ao mesmo tempo, ideologias nacionalistas, e interesses de estado ou étnicos militam activamente a favor da expulsão do Ocidente, na revisão de novas fronteiras entre estados, na desintegração de regimes, na utilização do terrorismo, e na redistribuição equilibrada da riqueza. Uma vez que qualquer sucesso na revisão destes temas, na óptica dos militantes extremistas, só lhes pode aumentar prestígio e riqueza, existe necessariamente um incessante e poderoso incentivo ao desafio com o Ocidente.
A acumulação destes factores e circunstâncias dão lugar à veia de tendência política, simbolizada pela expressão “anti-Western brinksmanship” onde a palavra “brinksmanship”, reflecte a arte ou prática militante de induzir, uma situação perigosa ou confrontação, até ao limite de segurança, de modo a forçar um resultado desejado; que no contexto, exprime a tendência dalguns actores do Médio Oriente, desafiaram directamente ou indirectamente os interesses Ocidentais, ao ponto de provocar a ameaça da sua intervenção. Nestas crises, os líderes do Médio Oriente, adoptam medidas utópicas de ideologias nacionalistas e religiosas devidamente adaptadas ao agrado simultâneo dos grupos desafectados. Estas ideologias indubitavelmente exploram variados factores no campo político: injustiças históricas contra o Ocidente; sentimentos revanchistas perante Israel (tema, veementemente defendido por bin Laden); e mais, identidades transnacionais, tais como o Arabismo e o Islão. Vejamos que efectivamente, na maioria dos casos, a resposta do Ocidente (ou Israel) a uma provocação, permite ao “brinksman” do Médio Oriente alcançar certos êxitos, os quais seriam impossíveis só pelo seu esforço. (John Fonseca-Robbins).

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O METAFORISMO HISTÓRICO E OS DEBATES POLÍTICOS

Posted by mar19433 on January 25, 2007

“Red Sunset”

O METAFORISMO HISTÓRICO
E OS DEBATES POLÍTICOS

No âmbito académico da comunicação política, existe imensa literatura acerca da investigação no uso de metáforas nos debates políticos. Uma das divisões desta literatura concentra-se na retórica da política externa americana, focando especialmente a linguagem usada por presidentes em tempos de crise ou guerra. Seja pela interpretação do estilo usado, na política externa ou noutra arena política, a maioria dos colaboradores desta literatura baseia-se na proposição que as metáforas não são meramente flores de retórica ou decoração; mas transgressões voluntariamente cometidas, que nos provocam, seduzem, e, essencialmente nos conduzem a uma interpretação e resposta a temas ou eventos de um modo diferente. Na adopção desta perspectiva, “escolásticos” da comunicação política enriquecem os seus conhecimentos com base na sabedoria dos antigos comentadores políticos – incluindo Aristóteles (384-322 a. C.), que observou há mais de dois milénios que o metaforismo imaginativo pelos actores políticos induz no receptor a “ver situações”, que doutra forma seriam iludentes ou incompreensíveis – bem como nos resultados obtidos pelos psicólogos cognitivos modernos, que desde há muito reconheceram, que a forma das pessoas interpretaram e responderam a uma nova informação, depende em parte do modo como essa informação é apresentada ou “encaixilhada”.

Porque as metáforas, por definição, direccionam a concentração mental às similaridades em vários domínios, os receptores são convidados a visualizar um tema ou fenómeno no contexto doutro tema ou fenómeno. O metaforismo é um inestimável instrumento de persuasão política. Em primeiro lugar, as características das metáforas “activam o consciente e subconsciente, originando respostas racionais e emocionais” dos receptores. Sugerindo que um líder político – “actua como Hitler”, por exemplo, é apto a produzir uma resposta mais emocional do que a mera sugestão – “actua como um chefe opressivo dum regime autoritário”, porque, evidentemente, existem emoções fortes associadas ao nome de Hitler. É este aspecto das metáforas, ou seja, a sua habilidade evocativa de associações tanto racionais como irracionais, e emocionais – que permite aos actores políticos o uso das metáforas para “ameaçar ou assegurar, aqueles que queremos encorajar a serem apoiantes ou apáticos”. Em segundo lugar, as metáforas actuam como poderosos instrumentos de retórica, porque podem ser utilizadas subtilmente com frases sugestivas ou referências oblíquas evocando uma particular metáfora, sem necessariamente expô-la explicitamente. A obliquidade favorece variados objectivos: nos casos onde seria considerado impolítico fomentar quaisquer comparações ou asserções, as alusões metafóricas permitem aos oradores a sugestão dessas conexões e, ao mesmo tempo, a negação de tal afirmação. Seleccionando as metáforas com rigor, os actores políticos podem calibrar mensagens às sensibilidades, preconceitos, e associações emocionais de particular audiências.

O estudo do metaforismo nos debates políticos, oferece o empolgamento e a iluminação necessária e crucial ao constante esforço das sociedades na compreensão das suas experiências e do mundo em que vivemos.
John Fonseca-Robbins.

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OS DIREITOS HUMANOS E A VIOLÊNCIA DOMÉSTICA

Posted by mar19433 on January 17, 2007

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL_____________________________

OS DIREITOS HUMANOS E A VIOLÊNCIA DOMÉSTICA

O desenvolvimento global das preocupações suscitadas à volta do “Caso Catarina Tallon” e de milhares doutros reflecte-se no título deste artigo. O mundo nos anos noventa testemunhou uma mudança dramática na forma em que os países abordam os problemas intrafamiliares ou violência doméstica contra as mulheres. Enquanto o problema era ignorado como um assunto privado pela maioria dos países, agora muitos destes aceitaram alguma responsabilidade na prevenção da violência doméstica e na incriminação dos transgressores. Alguns países aprovaram legislação, codificando a violência doméstica como um crime punível, criando campanhas mediáticas nacionais de sensibilização aos problemas expostos, e estabelecendo, pela primeira vez, postos de polícia totalmente administrados por mulheres de forma a encorajar, particularmente, as queixosas.
Estas medidas de mudança às práticas de outrora, são notavelmente visíveis nos países da Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA), dos quais, a maioria com excepção dos EUA e Canadá, ratificaram a convenção interamericana para a prevenção, punição, e erradicação de violência contra as mulheres, sendo este na realidade, o único tratado internacional visando a prevenção de violência contra as mulheres. Estes países ratificaram o tratado, não obstante o facto do mesmo permitir a qualquer indivíduo ou grupo a possibilidade da apresentação duma petição de queixa, junto à Comissão Interamericana dos Direitos Humanos, contra o estado infractor, citando violações de responsabilidade na protecção das mulheres. Alguns países Americanos foram dos primeiros do mundo, na conquista e identificação dos problemas de violência doméstica que tanto aflige milhares de mulheres. Já em 1978, Canadá, começou o grande desafio: na localização e no financiamento de abrigos às vítimas de abuso, e nos anos oitenta identificou o problema com projectos de investigação e prevenção. Em 1985, Brasil criou o primeiro posto de mulheres-polícia (iniciativa de apoio fundamental às vítimas de violência conjugal), e o governo federal Americano deu os primeiros passos no financiamento de abrigos às vítimas carentes. O primeiro país latino-americano que promulgou leis específicas à violência doméstica foi Peru em 1993, e Argentina, Chile e EUA seguiram o exemplo, um ano mais tarde.
Há séculos que os estados, ignoram os problemas de violência doméstica como um assunto privado e irrelevante à política governamental, e além disso, como organizações burocráticas são geralmente resistentes à mudança. Para os activistas, o grande desafio reside na sensibilização dos legisladores, à transição de assuntos tradicionalmente privados para temas de alto-interesse na conduta de futuras éticas sociais, e de debate, na praça pública. Durante crises ou mudanças políticas, deputados e outros dirigentes políticos são mais susceptíveis ao debate de variados temas nas relações estado-sociedade. Estes momentos de debate político criam por vezes oportunidades únicas aos grupos activistas para influenciar a acção do estado. Outras organizações internacionais focaram os seus esforços na criação de financiamentos aos programas governamentais que traduzem retórica em acção. Por exemplo, nos anos noventa, a organização intergovernamental “Pan American Health Organization” (PAHO), argumentou com êxito perante o Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento, que a violência doméstica não é um problema meramente privado, social, mas sim, um poderoso obstáculo ao desenvolvimento económico sustentável. Como resultado, em 1966, este banco garantiu vários milhões de dólares para o financiamento, em seis países latino-americanos, de programas de prevenção e assistência, às vítimas de violência conjugal.
Vemos então, que vários países passaram legislação nesta matéria, criando os mecanismos necessários, estabelecendo postos de abrigo e outros serviços sociais, contudo, estamos ainda muito longe de alcançar uma redução dramática nas variadas formas de violência e na responsabilização dos infractores.
A interacção dos estados, só poderá obter bons resultados através dos esforços constantes de todos os grupos interessados.

(Fonseca-Robbins, John)

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O JUDAÍSMO E A DIÁSPORA

Posted by mar19433 on January 16, 2007

In Hebrew revelation, the world was created in six days of strenuous physical activity followed by a single day of peaceful rest. This geometrical symbol reflects the fitting metaphor: the radii of six equal circles mark out the circumference of an identical circle placed in the centre.

Durante os anos noventa, a conexão – Diáspora vis-à-vis Israel – evoluiu em sentidos diferentes. Por quase uma década, Israelitas e judeus da Diáspora (comunidades judaicas radicadas fora da Palestina) acreditaram que a paz no Médio Oriente modificaria fundamentalmente, tanto o carácter judaico de Israel como as relações entre o estado soberano de Israel e a existência do Judaísmo no Ocidente. Uma paz compreensiva e duradoura facilitaria a Israel alcançar um nível de normalização, que não só iria reduzir as suas ligações e responsabilidades com a Diáspora, mas também faria que a Diáspora se libertasse de todos os conflitos relacionados com assuntos de defesa e segurança, que durante uma geração, sempre acompanharam a vida de todos nos seus países de domicílio.

Os anos noventa foram marcados pelo envolvimento acentuado dos movimentos liberais judaicos nos EUA, onde o tema emergente em debate tinha mais a ver com a relação entre Israel, a sua identidade judaica, e a comunidade judaica Americana, do que propriamente com a segurança física de Israel. Este debate, descrito como uma batalha entre secular e judeus religiosos ou entre a identidade israelita e a identidade judaica, foi o tema doméstico mais polémico, ardentemente discutido publicamente, com ramificações políticas, económicas e jurídicas. Somente a “al-Aqsa intifada”, em fins de Setembro de 2000, e a resultante onda de terrorismo que mereceu o lugar no centro da agenda judaica, temporariamente advertiu esta ruptura que ameaçou a sociedade Israelita. Certamente, a violência faz parte da “feature” comum da “Kulturkampf” Israelita.

Já antes da erupção de violência no Outono de 2000, este debate, acerca do carácter judaico de Israel foi considerado como o tema mais contestável, jamais enfrentado pela comunidade judaica Americana que procura o verdadeiro sentido da sua própria identidade. Se bem que estes argumentos estão mais relacionados com a realidade da vida judaica nos EUA, e assim, distantes dos debates internos de Israel; o contexto – Americano e Israelita – está contudo, estritamente interligado, já que os princípios e práticas em ambos sustentam-se reciprocamente. A política Israelita e sociedade sempre dependeram do governo e da comunidade judaica dos EUA, devendo deste modo, ter em conta as opiniões da Diáspora, nomeadamente às disposições de Israel sobre a guerra e a paz, e, também acerca do carácter democrático judaico de Israel.

A teologia judaica é distinta no que toca à ênfase atribuída ao conceito de uma “homeland”, ou seja, a Terra de Israel (Eretz-Israel). Este facto define o carácter da Diáspora Judaica como único, já que, viver em terra estranha significa teologicamente a rejeição ao plano de Deus. Para os judeus religiosos, a vida nos EUA é apenas uma paragem temporária, pelo menos conceptualmente. A visão do regresso à Terra de Israel está concebida simbolicamente na própria definição de comunidade judaica. Da mesma forma, a maioria das religiões não se revelam de acordo por mapas políticos e não estão unidas por colectividades, em regiões, estados ou países, contudo, o Judaísmo debruça-se, naturalmente mais para o nacionalismo do que para o transnacionalismo, ao contrário do Cristianismo ou Islamismo. Como reforçar os laços entre os judeus Americanos e Israel, é a questão fulcral que não cessa de preocupar a liderança dos judeus religiosos, uma vez que Israel é indispensável à sua identidade judaica nos EUA.

John Fonseca-Robbins

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PUBLICIDADE – O OXIGÉNIO DO TERRORISMO

Posted by mar19433 on January 15, 2007

COMUNICAÇÃO POLÍTICA
PUBLICIDADE – O OXIGÉNIO DO TERRORISMO
Bin Laden, “al Qaeda”, e outros grupos fundamentalistas Islâmicos actuam segundo as suas ideologias religiosas e políticas, fomentando e encorajando o fundamentalismo violento, dedicado e focado na destruição, substituição e mudança radical dos estados. O terrorismo generalizado foi e continua a ser uma das formas utilizadas na prossecução dessas ambições. Para os perpetradores do terror – cada atentado é como uma lufada de ar fresco que se prolonga por tempo indeterminado – até ao próximo acto de terror em qualquer parte do mundo e momento. As organizações terroristas reconhecem a reportagem maciça e imediata de 1º plano na mancha informativa dos “media” dedicada ao terrorismo, como um factor regozijador, ideal e eficaz na instrumentalização dos seus objectivos. As imagens horrorosas de 11 de Setembro de 2001, e mais recentemente, da destruição da sede da ONU em Bagdad, desta vez, alegadamente perpetrada pelo grupo fundamentalista 1 – Vanguarda Armada – são bem ilustrativas do intenso e imediato impacto mediático dirigido a todo o mundo, e em particular aos Estados Unidos.
Comparativamente, em Setembro de 1970, militantes da Frente Popular de Libertação da Palestina (FPLP) desviaram simultaneamente quatro aeronaves, originalmente com destino a Nova Iorque, com cerca de 600 passageiros maioritariamente Americanos. Três dos aparelhos acabaram por aterrar numa parte remota da Jordânia. O intenso drama prolongou-se por três semanas. Os factos foram relatados, contudo na altura, a tecnologia das comunicações ainda não permitia transmissões ao vivo, e as emissões via satélite tinham apenas dado os primeiros passos. Naturalmente para os militantes, depois de todo o planeamento: foi um episódio para esquecer; uma desilusão, uma decepção total. Enquanto que, por outro lado, durante os primeiros cinco dias a seguir à “Terça-feira Negra” alguns canais da televisão e rádio relataram incessantemente todos os factos, sem de outro modo, as habituais pausas comerciais, e, os magazines nomeadamente Newsweek e TIME dedicaram editoriais por oito semanas a fio focando o terrorismo ou temas relacionados.
Como é que os terroristas poderiam melhorar os resultados dos seus objectivos, a não ser – cativando a atenção das suas audiências alvo – já que por ignomínia numa guerra assimétrica, mas utilizando as mais modernas tecnologias! As sondagens de opinião revelaram que literalmente todos os Americanos seguiram as primeiras notícias dos ataques, ou pela televisão ou rádio. As pretensões e expectativas dos arquitectos do terror de 11 de Setembro não poderiam ser melhores. Referindo-se aos pilotos kamikaze, o próprio bin Laden, alegadamente exclamou na altura – “Aqueles jovens…exprimiram por actos, em Nova Iorque e Washington, discursos que transcenderam quaisquer outros jamais proferidos”. Com estas palavras, bin Laden revelava que considera o terrorismo como o veículo de comunicação das suas mensagens. O facto da comunicação social americana, no período 11 de Setembro 2001 – 6 de Outubro 2001 ter dado mais atenção a bin Laden do que ao presidente Americano, foi notável, se considerarmos que George W. Bush realizou 54 discursos públicos durante o mesmo período, comparado com bin Laden que não apareceu em público, em conferências ou entrevistas tête-à-tête.
Os terroristas e os “media” são como sócios num casamento de conveniência: os terroristas necessitam de toda a publicidade possível; os “media” necessitam de eventos dramáticos, trágicos, chocantes, e sensacionais para sustentar a popularidade ou circulação, não pondo em causa o dever de informar o público de todos os eventos para que os cidadãos interpretem e escolhem decisões correctas, na continuidade de uma democracia saudável. (John Fonseca-Robbins)

1.Fundamentalista. Adepto do neo-reformista radical revolucionário Islamismo.

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THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION

Posted by mar19433 on October 22, 2006


House of Braganza’s Coat of Arms

and “King John IV”

INTRODUCTION

UNION OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, 1580-1640

After Philip II of Spain had occupied Portugal in 1580, the island of Terceira in the Azores held out for António de Crato, who himself sought alliances in England and France. In 1582, a French expedition to establish him in the Azores was defeated, and in 1589, an English attempt upon Lisbon, led by Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Norris, failed dismally. Nevertheless, although António died in Paris in 1595, the true symbol of Portuguese independence was not the prior of Crato but King Sebastian himself. The Portuguese people refused to believe that he was dead and nourished a messianic faith in his reappearance, of which four pretenders sought to avail themselves, the last as late as 1600 and as far afield as Venice.

Meanwhile, Philip arrived in Portugal and was accepted as King Philip I (1580-98) by the Cortes held at Tomar (1581). He undertook to preserve Portuguese autonomy, to consider the union as a personal one like that of Aragon and Castile under Ferdinand and Isabella, to appoint only Portuguese to the administration, to summon Cortes frequently, and to be accompanied by a Portuguese council in Madrid. These undertakings were, however, neglected by Philip II (III of Spain, 1598-1621) and completely violated by Philip III (IV of Spain, 1621-40).

Portuguese resentment against Spanish rule was further increased by the failure of these kings to visit Portugal, the appointment of Spaniards to Portuguese offices, the loss of trade consequent on Spain’s foreign wars, and the levying of taxation to sustain these wars. In 1624, the Dutch seized Bahia in Brazil, only to be expelled by a joint Spanish and Portuguese expedition (1625). However, in 1630 they occupied Pernambuco and the adjoining sugar estates, which they held for a generation.

The final straw was the Count-Duke de Olivares’ plan (1640), of using Portuguese troops against the equally discontented Catalans. Two Portuguese insurrections, in 1634 and 1637, had failed to attain dangerous proportions, but in 1640, Spain’s powers were extended to the utmost by war with France and revolt in Catalonia. The French minister, Cardinal de Richelieu, already had agents in Lisbon, and a leader was found in John, Duke of Braganza; a grandson of the Duchess Catherine (niece of John III) whose claims had been overridden in 1580 by Philip II of Spain. Taking advantage of the unpopularity of the governor, Margaret of Savoy, Duchess of Mantua, and her secretary of state Miguel de Vasconcelos, the leaders of the party of independence carried through a nationalist revolution on December 1st, 1640. Vasconcelos was almost the only victim; the Spanish garrisons were driven out; and on December 15, the Duke of Braganza was crowned as King John IV (1640-56).

THE REVOLUTION OF 1640

The Portuguese people groaned under the powerlessness and poverty which fell to their lot during the “Sixty Years’ Captivity”. None of the advantages, which had been so eloquently prophesied by Christovão de Moura as the inevitable result of a union with Spain, had been experienced. Instead of being protected by great Spanish armies, the colonies and trade of Portugal had been left an open prey to the enemies of Spain; it was on account of her union with Spain that the Dutch and English attacked the Portuguese possessions in both East and West; and in return for all she lost, Portugal did not even have the satisfaction of retaining the independence of its local government, but was administered for the benefit of Spaniards alone. The proverbial Castilian arrogance was especially aggravating to the nobles and people of Portugal; there was no attempt made to unite the two peoples; they kept apart like oil and water, and the traditional hatred of the Spaniard grew to be more intense than ever. The loss of material prosperity and the insolent demeanour of the Spanish officials affected all classes, high and low, and incited them to rebel, and to these causes must be added the influence of the Portuguese writers. The great Luís de Camões (1525-1580) had not lived to see the Spaniards supreme in his beloved country, but he had successors during the “Sixty Years’ Captivity”, who sang in the same lofty strain of the great deeds of the Portuguese warriors during the heroic period. Such poems as the “Primeiro Cerco de Diu” (“The First Siege of Diu”), by Francisco de Andrade; the “Segundo Cerco de Diu”, by Jerónimo Corte-Real; the “Afonso Africano”, by Vasco Mousinho de Quebedo; and the “Malaca Conquistada”, by Francisco de Sá de Menezes, were all calculated to stir the hearts of the Portuguese of the 17th century, and to make them desire to be worthy of their great forefathers. Nor were the prose writers less eloquent than the poets in telling of the great deeds of the past; the “Décadas” of Diogo do Couto, and the “Asia”, “Europa”, “Africa”, and “America Portuguesa”, of Manuel de Faria e Sousa, continued the work of João de Barros in making the Portuguese proud of their past exploits, while the historians, Bernardo de Brito and António Brandão, in their “Monarquia Lusitânia”, told the story of the centuries of independence before Portugal became a province of Spain.

A universal feeling of discontent had arisen during the reigns of Philip III, and Philip IV, but the final impulse from passive discontentment to active rebellion was supplied by the energy of certain Portuguese noblemen, who relied in part for success on the weakness of Spain and on help from France. The Spain of Philip IV was indeed very different to the Spain of Charles V or Philip II; its days of greatness were over; Holland was practically independent; and, Catalonia was in revolt. On the other hand, France had passed through the terrible civil wars of the 16th century, and was being moulded into a mighty kingdom by the hand of Richelieu. One of the keynotes of Richelieu’s policy was to harass Spain; and for this purpose the great cardinal encourage the revolt of the Catalans in 1639, and had long fostered the feeling of discontent in Portugal. As early as 1636, one of Richelieu’s secret agents is found writing to his master, “All Portugal cries aloud – when will the King of France deliver us from the Pharaoh of Spain?” and in 1638 the cardinal sent one of his most trusted agents, the Chevalier de Saint-Pé, to report upon the disposition of the Portuguese people. Richelieu soon grasped the situation of affairs, and resolved to encourage an open rebellion in Portugal, in order to secure an independent ally in the Iberian Peninsula, which should be such a thorn in the side of Spain as Scotland had in former days been in the side of England.

The discontent of the people was shown in many overt acts; in 1634, the people of Lisbon refused to pay their taxes; in 1637, a serious riot broke out at Évora, which remained in a state of insurrection for many months; and attacks upon Spanish soldiers and officials constantly took place all over the country. Nevertheless, the discontented people of Portugal wanted some one to rally round; the nobility sought a leader. This leader and representative was found in John, 8th Duke of Braganza, the legitimate heir to the throne. This great nobleman was the head of the noblest family in Portugal, and the direct lineal descendant of the bastard son of John “the Great”, who had married the daughter of the Holy Constable, and he was further the grandson of Donna Catherine, the rightful heiress to the Cardinal-King, Dom Henry. Philip II, had purchased the acquiescence of the husband of Donna Catherine in his usurpation by securing to him the vast possessions of the Braganza family in Portugal, but he had not fulfilled his promise of the grant of Brazil in full sovereignty, to the great disgust of the heiress to the throne of Portugal. She had inspired her hatred for Spain and her love for Portugal into her son, Dom Theodosio, 7th duke, but her grandson, Dom John, was a timid nobleman, who preferred an easy life to a crown. Dom John had succeeded to the duchy and estates in 1630, at the age of twenty-six, and he had married Donna Luisa de Guzman, daughter of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, in 1633. This marriage had been hailed with delight by Olivares, the Spanish Minister, as it seemed to bind the Braganza family closer to Spain, and he persuaded Philip IV, to grant Dom John as a wedding-gift, the duchy and lordship of Guimarães, which had been the property of Dom Edward, youngest son of Emmanuel “the Fortunate”, the prince through whom the Duke of Braganza traced his claim to the throne.

Nevertheless, this marriage did not cement the friendship of the House of Braganza with Spain. On the contrary, the duchess seemed to surrender her Spanish nationality; not only she made a point of speaking Portuguese, but also became more patriotic than the Portuguese themselves; she never forgot that her husband was by rights a king, and was encouraged to use all her great abilities to scheme for the throne of Portugal by the recollection of a prophecy made to her in her childhood that she should be a queen. Dom John himself did not share her enthusiasm; he was no warrior, but loved hunting, music, and the arts, and his lovely hunting-seat at Vila Viçosa, far more than he did politics. However, his easy nature made him subservient to the will of his duchess, and she, through the duke’s agent, João Pinto Ribeiro, Professor of Civil Law at Coimbra, let the nobility of Portugal know that the Duke of Braganza would put himself at their head, if they would but strike a blow for the freedom of their country.

Portugal was at the period, when the Duchess of Braganza involved her husband in her ambitious schemes, under the nominal rule of Margaret of Savoy, Duchess of Mantua; and the Court of this princess was, contrary to the promises made by Philip II, to the Cortes of Tomar, entirely filled with foreigners. Her Lord High Stewart or Mordomo-Mor was the Marquis de la Puebla, a Spaniard, and her Estribeiro-Mor, or Master of the Horse, was the Marquis de Bainetti, an Italian, while among more important posts, two Spaniards, Don Didace de Cardenas and Don Fernando de Castro, were respectively general commanding the Portuguese cavalry, and controller of the Portuguese navy. The most important Portuguese national admitted to her council was Dom Sebastião de Matos de Noronha, Archbishop of Braga, Primate of the Kingdom, and a wealthy nobleman, but the chief administrative power was confided to Miguel de Vasconcelos de Brito, Secretary of State. Naturally, the Portuguese people hated this man with the intensity of hatred only felt for a renegade. He had won the favour of Olivares, by his skill in squeezing money out of Portugal, and his energy and activity made him indispensable to the Duchess of Mantua. However, if all classes of the Portuguese people hated him, he was more especially obnoxious to the Portuguese nobility owing to his policy of excluding them from all posts of honour and emolument, and to his personal insolence towards them.

This was then, the state of the government and the general position of affairs in Portugal when João Pinto Ribeiro, acting with the full sanction of the Duchess, and the lukewarm assent of the Duke, of Braganza, began to form a conspiracy among the leading noblemen to bring about a revolution and once for all, expel the detested Spaniards. If he could only combine the nobles to take the lead and strike the first blow, he knew well that the people would warmly support them. The first step was to make the future king acquainted with his friends, and for this purpose, great hunting parties were organized at Vila Viçosa, to which the most patriotic Portuguese noblemen were invited in turn. This behaviour, and the attitude of the young duchess, began to inspire Olivares with a vague alarm, and he began to regret the policy, which had allowed the rightful heir to the throne of Portugal to retain his vast estates in the quarter where his influence was most to be feared. He first offered the government of the Milanese, an office generally held by a prince, to the Duke of Braganza, and, when the appointment was declined on the score of ignorance of Italian politics, the astute Spanish Minister began to feel still uneasier. However, it was necessary to disguise his apprehensions, for he knew that it was not only unwise but impossible to arrest the duke on his estates without causing serious disturbances, and he therefore directed the duke to make a tour of Portugal in his capacity of Constable to inspect the conditions of the defences. This tour instead, gave the duke an opportunity to make the acquaintance of the greater part of the people, while he avoided falling into the various traps set out for him. Frustrated, and foolishly, Olivares who never understood that the Portuguese were a separate race, delivered his last stroke of policy; he ordered out the whole ban and arrière-ban of Portugal to serve under the king in person in putting down the Catalan rebellion, and directed the Duke of Braganza to proceed to Madrid. Wisely, the duke delayed his departure, and João Pinto Ribeiro informed the noblemen who had been forming a conspiracy in Lisbon that they now must strike at once or it would be too late.

THE SUCCESS OF THE CONSPIRATORS

The names of these noblemen are worthy of record, not only because of the daring and successful revolution they initiated, but because they show how patriotic the Portuguese nobility were as a body; since most of the famous families of the early history of Portugal and of the heroic period are represented among them.

The leaders of the famous forty who planned the revolution were Miguel de Almeida, a venerable nobleman, at whose house the first meeting of the conspirators was held; Pedro de Mendonça Furtado, Hereditary Grand Chamberlain; António and Luís de Almada; Bernardo da Fonseca; Jorge de Mello, Hereditary Grand Huntsman; António de Mello de Menezes, his brother; Estevão, and Luís da Cunha; Rodrigo and Emmanuel de Sá; Pedro Mascarenhas, Carlos de Noronha, Gaston de Coutinho and António de Saldanha. The Archbishop of Lisbon, Rodrigo da Cunha, the most popular ecclesiastical dignitary of the realm, if not actually a conspirator, certainly had knowledge of what was going on through his relatives, the Almadas and Da Cunhas. The confederates met regularly and skilfully planned their rising, and in all their deliberations João Pinto Ribeiro, though not a noble himself, and somehow looked down on by the forty, showed himself the boldest and most sagacious leader of them all. The keystone of their plan was to make a show of legality, and to assert that they were merely placing the rightful king upon the throne. Their preparations were fully made, when João Pinto Ribeiro brought the news that the blow must be struck at once, or else that the Duke of Braganza must proceed to Madrid.

The 1st of December 1640, was the day appointed for the revolution and on the morning of that day the conspirators assembled by different streets in front of the palace. There had been no treachery, and consequently the viceregal court was quite unprepared for resistance. A pistol shot from Ribeiro gave the signal, and each conspirator went to his appointed place to accomplish his assigned task. Dom Miguel de Almeida overpowered the German guards of the palace without any difficulty, and Dom Jorge de Mello and Dom Estevão da Cunha were equally successful with the Spanish guards. The third party, under the leadership of Ribeiro, forced their way into the palace, and moved towards the apartments of the hated Secretary of State, Miguel de Vasconcellos. On their way they met Francisco de Soares de Albergaria, the “Corregedor do cível”, or civil judge, who, in answer to their cries of “Long live the Duke of Braganza!” shouted, “Long live the King of Spain and Portugal!” and was then immediately shot. They next came across António Correa, the secretary’s chief clerk, whose insolence had almost rivalled his master’s, and António de Menezes struck him down with his poniard and severely wounded him. At last, they reached the apartments of the secretary, whom they discovered cowardly hidden in a cupboard under a mass of papers. The trembling wretch was immediately dragged from his concealment, and shot dead by Dom Rodrigo de Sá. All parties now rushed to the part of the palace inhabited by the Duchess of Mantua, whom they found with the Archbishop of Braga. The princess was no coward, and boldly faced the conspirators, but Dom Carlos de Noronha informed her that, in fact, she was a prisoner, and the life of the Archbishop, who attempted to cut his way through his opponents, was with difficulty saved by Dom Miguel de Almeida.

These successes in the palace were quickly followed by equal triumphs in the city of Lisbon. The populace of all classes detested the Spanish domination; they rose in a body, armed themselves as best they could, and arrested every Spaniard they could find from the Marquis de la Puebla to the naval officers on shore from the Spanish vessels lying in the Tagus.

Dom António de Saldanha, as previously arranged, entered the “Relação”, or High Court of Justice, and informed the judges of the revolution, and the president, Gonçalo de Sousa, immediately began to pronounce his decrees in the name of King John IV, instead of King Philip III. Dom Gaston de Coutinho set free all the alleged political prisoners, and some brave young men rowed off to the three Spanish galleons in the port, and easily obtained possession of them, since most of their officers had already been arrested on shore. There remained only the citadel, or castle, of St. George, garrisoned by a strong Spanish force under Don Luiz de Campo. This important fortress was obtained by a stratagem of Dom António de Almada, who forced the Duchess of Mantua to sign an order for its surrender by a threat to assassinate all the Spanish prisoners already taken, and the undaring governor willingly obeyed the order.

The conspirators then assembled in the palace, and amidst the grand elation and shouts of the people, the Archbishop of Lisbon was proclaimed Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, with Dom Miguel de Almeida, Dom Pedro de Mendonça Furtado, and Dom António de Almada as duly elected councillors of state. The new government sent off envoys in all directions to announce the news of the successful revolution, and obtained peaceable possession of all the chief fortresses and strongholds round Lisbon, Belém, Almada, and Cascais.

CORONATION OF JOHN IV.

The Duke and Duchess of Braganza were all this time waiting with feverish impatience at Vila Viçosa for news of the great undertaking, and on the following day, Sunday, December 2nd, Dom Jorge de Mello arrived, after travelling all night, and hailed the Duke and Duchess as King and Queen of Portugal, whilst Afonso de Mello took possession of Elvas, the strongest city in Portugal, in the name of John IV, in a bloodless recapture. On December 3rd, the new sovereign entered Lisbon amidst general rejoicings, and on December 15th, he was solemnly crowned in the Cathedral of Lisbon.

Never was a sudden revolution more successful. From Porto to Faro the people, everywhere rose in rebellion; the Spanish arms were torn down; the Spanish garrisons were all expelled, and John IV, once again was hailed with jubilant acclamation. A Cortes was summoned to meet at Lisbon for the first time since 1619, and on January 19, 1641, John IV was declared King of Portugal, as the rightful heir of Emmanuel “the Fortunate”, and the whole Cortes swore to obey him, and recognised his eldest son, Dom Theodosio, as heir to the throne. The new sovereign determined to meet his loyal people half way, so he declared that his patrimonial estates were sufficient to meet the expenses of his royal household, and that the revenues of the Crown lands should for the future be spent on national needs. He bestowed important posts and orders on the leading conspirators, and directed Don Fernando de la Cueva to surrender the fortress of S. Julian, the only place that resisted his authority.
The last person to be informed of this sudden and successful revolution was the former king, Philip IV of Spain. His courtiers all feared to tell him the news, and when it became necessary to break it to him, Olivares accomplished the feat with his usual cockiness:

“Sire”, he said to the king – “ I have to congratulate you on a most fortunate event. Your Majesty has just obtained a powerful duchy, and some magnificent estates” – “By what means”, replied the astonished monarch. – “The Duke of Braganza”, said Olivares, “ has allowed himself to be seduced by the people, who have proclaimed him King of Portugal. His vast estates are therefore forfeited, and become the property of your Majesty, who, by the annihilation of this family, will in future reign securely and peaceably over that kingdom”.

Olivares had every reason to speak as he did, for there could be no doubt that Portugal, weakened by her long subjection, could perhaps do little to resist the power of Spain. However, in any case, Spain was too heavily involved in foreign wars, distracted by the Catalan rebellion, and indeed unable to exert her strength at that time. Both the new king and his advisers felt, nevertheless, that it would not be wise to count too much or too long upon this fortunate circumstance, and he sent ambassadors all over Europe to inform the foreign sovereigns of the revolution, and to beg for their help and alliance.

The old Chancellor Oxenstiern, who governed Sweden after the death of her warrior monarch, Gustavus Adolphus, during the minority of Queen Christina, promptly recognised the accession of the new dynasty, and welcome it. Charles I. of England also recognised John IV, although he was too much occupied by his quarrels with the Parliament to pay much attention to foreign politics. The Dutch received the news of the revolution with much enjoyment, and compared it to their own successful rebellion against Spain, and they immediately concluded a treaty with Portugal, and promised to send assistance. However, it was to France that John IV looked with most confidence for help; he remembered the secret emissaries of Richelieu and their lavish promises; and on January 22, 1641, three days after his coronation, he sent two of his most accomplished courtiers, Francisco de Mello and António Coelho de Carvalho, on a special mission to Paris.

They were received with much cordiality by the great cardinal, who understood how thoroughly Spain must be crippled by the Catalan and Portuguese rebellions, and, to their surprise, also by the Queen of France, Anne of Austria, the sister of Philip IV. De Mello ventured to hint his surprise at this hearty reception, when the queen made a famous reply: – “True it is, that I am the sister of his Catholic Majesty, but am I not also the mother of the Dauphin?”

Their negotiations ended in the conclusion of an offensive and defensive treaty between France and Portugal, signed on June 1, 1641, by which the King of France promised to make no peace with Spain until the independence of Portugal was fully guaranteed and recognised. These embassies and treaties ended in the arrival of a strong French fleet, under the command of the Chevalier de Brézé, in the Tagus, on August 7, 1641, followed by a Dutch fleet, under Admiral Gylfels, on September 10th.

THE CAMINHA CONSPIRACY

At this very time, before the first king of the House of Braganza had been a year upon the throne, a serious conspiracy was in progress, which had for its aim the re-establishment of the power of Spain. This conspiracy was almost entirely the work of one man, Dom Sebastião de Mattos de Noronha, the maverick and nonconformist Archbishop of Braga, Primate of Portugal. The new government had not in any way interfered with this prelate, but he felt that he had lost the power, which he had enjoyed during the viceroyalty of the Duchess of Mantua, and he had never forgiven the danger in which his life had been placed on the day of the outbreak of the revolution in Lisbon. He first engaged the Marquis of Villa Real, and his son, the Duke of Caminha, to join him. Their family boasted of royal blood, and ranked next to that of the Duke of Aveiro in the kingdom of Portugal, and they felt indignant that no important posts had been conferred upon them for their acquiescence in the revolution. The marquis was won over by a promise that he should be the Viceroy of Portugal, if the conspiracy succeeded, and his son threw himself so heartily into the project that the whole plot is generally known as the “Caminha conspiracy”. The other chief laymen engaged were the Count of Armamar, the nephew of the primate, the Count of Ballerais, Lourenço Peres de Carvalho, keeper of the treasury, who feared to lose the lucrative post which he had held so long under the Spanish domination, and António Correa, the confidential clerk of the murdered Vasconcellos. A far more important ally than any of these noblemen and officials, was the Grand Inquisitor of Portugal, Dom Sebastião de Tello, Bishop of Leiria, who was persuaded to promise the “novos Cristãos”, of half-converted Jews, a cessation of all persecution if they would join in overthrowing John IV. They, on their part, were ready to assist because the new monarch had absolutely refused to make any concessions to them for fear of offending the Pope.

The arrangements were soon made; it was settled that the “novos Cristãos” were to set fire to the palace on August 5th; that the king was to be stabbed in the confusion which would ensue; and that the Duchess of Mantua should be released from her convent, and again placed in power. Olivares, naturally and gladly acquiesced in all the villainous schemes of the treacherous archbishop, and despatches giving all the details of the plot were entrusted to a converted Jew named Baese, to send to Madrid. However, these despatches fell into the hands of Marquis of Ayamonte, a Spanish nobleman, and a relation of the new Queen of Portugal, who was acting as intermediary between John IV and his bother-in-law, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, and the marquis promptly, sent them to Lisbon. Forewarned was forearmed, and on August 5th, the day fixed for the rising, all the leaders of the conspiracy without exception were arrested. Baese confessed, when put to the torture, and an August 29th all the noblemen concerned, including the Marquis of Villa Real and the Duke of Caminha, were publicly executed at Lisbon, while the Primate and the Grand Inquisitor were condemned to imprisonment for life.

Shamefully this severe punishment did not check the ardour of yet more traitors who were mainly officials and discontented nobles, and in 1643, a new plot was discovered, headed by Francisco de Lucena, Secretary of State, who was immediately executed.

THE VICTORY OF MONTIJO

In spite of all the difficulties, the government managed to get together an army; it was neither well-disciplined nor well-equipped, but popular enthusiasm took the place of experience. And on May 26, 1642, the Portuguese under the command of Mathias de Albuquerque, defeated a Spanish army under the Baron de Molingen at Montijo. This victory, which was loudly compared to that of Aljubarrota, invigorated the spirit of the Portuguese people, and indeed encouraged them to persist in fighting for their deservedly independence and dignity. From every quarter of the globe news arrived that the Old Portuguese possessions had declared for John IV. Mozambique, Goa, Malacca, and Macao, all threw off the abhorrent domination of Spain, and prepared to send money and men to Lisbon; while Brazil, the most valuable possession of the Portuguese crown, since the Dutch had taken possession of the Asiatic trade, began a gallant struggle for the House of Braganza, a struggle which brought about a war with the Dutch in Europe, and lost the Portuguese the assistance which had been promised them in 1641 by the arrival of the fleet under Gylfels.

MAURICE OF NASSAU IN BRAZIL

When the news arrived, in Brazil, of the successful revolution of December 1640, Dom António Telles da Silva, the Portuguese Governor-General at once proclaimed King John IV at San Salvador, and the Portuguese in the Dutch captainships felt an immediate desire to join their brethren. Matters of European policy however prevented them from striking a blow at once; John IV could not afford to make enemies of the Dutch, and one of the terms of his alliance with them was that matters should remain exactly as they were in Brazil for ten years. However, the Portuguese colonists had not to wait ten years owing to the ungrateful behaviour of the Dutch themselves.

The Dutch West India Company could not appreciate the political ideas of Maurice of Nassau; these traders wanted large profits but definitely not, a great empire; they were disgusted at the amounts spent on the fortresses and the army, and in 1644 they recalled the great man whose ideas were too grand for them to fathom. Immediately on his departure, matters worsened in the Dutch captainships. His successors, a committee of merchants, neglected the fortresses, and aroused the hatred of the Portuguese sugar planters by their exactions, and though they sent home an unparalleled amount of sugar and money for one year, it was the only year they remained in office; for in 1645, the whole of the Portuguese colonists in the Dutch captainships burst into insurrection. It was in vain for the Dutch authorities to complain to Dom António Telles da Silva; he answered that it was not his fault if the Portuguese revolted; they did not do so under his orders or directions; and the Portuguese ambassador at the Hague made the same assertion in the name of the king.
Never has an insurrection been so rapidly successful; António Moniz Barreto and António Teixeira de Mello speedily reduced the province of Maranham, and João Fernandes Vieira, occupied the whole of the province of Pernambuco, and drove the Dutch into their capital. The neglected fortresses were easily taken, and soon the Dutch held no place, but the Recife.

It was in vain for Holland to declare war against Portugal, and to send great armaments to Brazil; the national movement was too strong to be resisted; the Dutch won some naval victories but could gain no fresh foothold in the country, and in 1655 the island of the Recife was abandoned after a ten years’ siege, and the King of Portugal once more reigned over the whole of Brazil.

JOHN IV. OFFERS TO ABDICATE

Great as was the triumph of the revolt in Brazil, it at first filled the heart of the King of Portugal with alarm, for it might deprived him of an ally in Europe on whose valuable assistance he had firmly relied. Everywhere, he looked in vain for help. Sweden could do nothing; England was torn by civil war; and in France his ally Cardinal Richelieu, had been succeeded as supreme minister by Cardinal Mazarin. John IV, instinctively felt that he could not depend upon Mazarin, who would certainly throw him over, if a peace should be made between France and Spain, and in his despair he made on offer to resign his throne to a French prince, who should bring ample assistance from France. His offer of abdication following correspondence to the Mazarin came to nothing, and it may well be doubted if John IV would have had the power to introduce a foreign prince in this way; and if he had succeeded, Mazarin would have abandoned Portugal with equal certainty even if a French prince had been on its throne. Years passed on, occupied with these various schemes and entreaties for assistance, and it was not until John IV threatened to make peace at any price with Philip IV, that Mazarin’s trusted agent the Chevalier de Jant signed an offensive and defensive alliance with Portugal on September 7, 1655.

THE REVIVAL OF PORTUGAL

Everywhere, the people of Portugal stood staunchly by their legitimate monarch. Brazil recognised his authority and sent him what help she could; the Indian and Chinese possessions contributed what they could in money, and his great admiral Dom Salvador Correa de Sá e Benevides defeated several Spanish armadas, and conquered Angola and the former Portuguese possessions on the African coast.

King John IV, the first king of the House of Braganza, died on November 6, 1656. His eldest son Dom Theodosio, whom he had created Prince of Brazil, had predeceased him in 1653, and his heir was a boy of thirteen, later Affonso VI.

The victory of Montijo and the insurrection in Brazil show that the people had recovered from the inertness and sloth, which had permitted Philip II to establish the power of Spain over them. The struggle and differences with Spain were not concluded; yet, the people never dreamed of failure.
New and national institutions arose under the direction of João Pinto Ribeiro to take the place of the effete institutions of the Sixty Years’ Captivity; councils of war and the colonies were organised at Lisbon; ships were built and armies raised; new tribunals such as the “Junta do Comércio” were erected.

Nor were men of letters backward in encouraging the revival of independence; Francisco de Sá de Menezes the poet, António Vieira the preacher, and Jacinto Freire de Andrade, the biographer of Dom João de Castro, all showed the spirit of patriotism, and it is not unworthy of notice that the first Portuguese newspaper, the Gazeta de Lisboa was established in 1641. The whole course of the Revolution of 1640 shows that the people of Portugal in the seventeenth century were not unworthy of their ancestors, and that they had learnt much, because they had suffered much, during those sixty years.

The centennial Camões celebrations showed that the Brazilians are still proud of their mother country, and that the Portuguese race on both sides of the Atlantic was ready to develop new energy and perseverance, and to prove its descent from the men who under Affonso Henriques conquered the Moors; who under John I. and John IV rejected the rule of the Spaniards; who under Affonso de Albuquerque and João de Castro made their names famous from Arabia to Japan; and who, by the labours of Prince Henry “the Navigator” and the voyage of Vasco da Gama, initiated a new era in the history of Portugal. (End).

Nb. Small excerpt from major Paper “The Portuguese Revolution” by
Fonseca-Robbins, John (2006)
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PROJECT FINANCE

Posted by mar19433 on September 13, 2006

Project finance means financing of an industrial (or infrastructure) project with myriad capital needs, often based on non-recourse or limited recourse structures, where project debt, equity, and potentially leases used to finance the project are paid back from the cash flow generated by the project, with the project’s assets, rights and interests held as collateral. An incredibly flexible and comprehensive financing solution demanding a long-term and realistic lending approach.
The finance technique was perfected in the 70s for major private-sector projects, mainly in the area of oil and gas exploration and extraction, but has been extended much widely since then. Project finance techniques are now applied across the world to numerous privately promoted infrastructure projects including power stations, tower-wind generators, gas pipelines, waste-disposal plants, waste-to-energy plants, telecommunications facilities, bridges, tunnels, toll roads, railway networks, city-centre tram links, all types of housing projects, and now the building of hospitals, clinic facilities, government accommodation and tourist facilities. Financial markets have become increasingly sophisticated in engineering financial packages to finance almost any type of reasonably predictable revenue stream.
The pace of project financing has been rising at a significant rate, according to Reuters’ Loan Price Corporation, which provides loan market news, data and analytics. In 2004, there was some $1.2 billion of project financing activity in the United States alone. A year later, that number more than tripled to $3.7 billion. While most of these financing related to the energy sector, industrial project finance remains the domain of a selected few institutions, whose specialists closely examine key areas such as its management, capital structure, the company’s position within its industry, and the broader market in which it operates.
(fonseca-robbins, john)

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